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ABSTRACT
This study presentsa testing methodology to analyze potential price asymmetriesamong
the farm, wholesale, and retaillevels of the U.S. broiler industry.Lag length, direction of
causality, and asymmetric relationshipsare empirically determined. Results suggest that
concentration and power of the integratorsin the industry have allowed the wholesale
price to become the center, causal price in the market. Asymmetric price transmissions,
however, are limited. While downward movements in the wholesale price are passed on
more fully to growers thanincreasesin the wholesale price, only consumers in the North
Centralregion of the U.S. sharea largerportion of wholesalers’ price increasesthanprice
decreases.
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Price changes between market levels and
among spatially separated markets should be
symmetric. Considerable attention, however,
has been devoted to determining if price trans-
missions act differently dependent on the di-
rection of the initiating price change. Of par-
amount concern has been whether or not
wholesalers of some agricultural commodities
have the power to asymmetrically influence
the prices on the farm and retail levels. Past
studies addressing this question have focused
on commodities such as fresh vegetables
(Ward), dairy products (Kinnucan and Forker),
citrus (Pick, Karrenbrock, and Carman), cattle
(Bailey and Brorsen), and pork (Boyd and
Brorsen; Punyawadee, Boyd, and Faminow),
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and have reached varying conclusions. Our
study examined price relationships in the U.S.
broiler industry using a complete, refined test-
ing methodology built on the efforts noted
above.
The methodology is complete in that em-
pirical tests are used at every stage of the anal-
ysis. The four-step procedure begins with unit
root testing to determine the correct form for
the data, continues with lag length determin-
ation and causality tests for flow durations
and direction, and concludes with asymmetry
tests. The methodology is refined in its use of
multiple criteria and testing strategies where
questions have arisen concerning their appro-
priateness in varying situations.
The broiler industry has not been investi-
gated previously for asymmetry, despite struc-
tural reasons for concern. Especially apparent
is the increased wholesale concentration in the
industry. Further, the broiler industry is highly
vertically integrated, giving the wholesale lev-
el strong influence throughout the market. Ad-
ditionally, the spatial aspect of broiler produc-280 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
tion means regional variations in price
transmissions may exist.
The three specific objectives of this re-
search were to determine if (a) decreases in
the wholesale price of U.S. broilers are passed
on to growers more than increases, (b) con-
sumer prices respond more to increases in the
broiler wholesale price than to decreases, and
(c) these price transmission processes vary by
region at the retail level.
Broiler Industry Structure
The modern broiler industry is marked by
many structural elements of imperfect com-
petition: high concentration, vertical integra-
tion, advertising, and product differentiation.
While vertical integration has long existed,
these other conditions have come into promi-
nence during the recent past. In particular,
through expansions and buyouts over the de-
cade examined in our study (1983 through
1992), the industry’s four-firm concentration
ratio rose from 32.8 to 40.4 (Broiler Zndustry).
This concentrated wholesale level consists of
large, vertically integrated firms called inte-
grators. Integrators own hatcheries, feed mills,
and processing plants. They typically purchase
eggs from breeders while hatched chicks are
sent out to growers under contract.
Approximately 90% of all broilers are
grown under contract. The contractual ar-
rangement between grower and integrator
makes a grower’s proximity to integrators es-
pecially important. One obvious risk to a
grower is the possibility of the local integrator
closing down or relocating. The risk from the
point of view of this study, however, is that
the integrator will take advantage of growers,
offering them prices below competitive levels.
Provision of inputs is split between grower
and integrator. The grower provides housing
and labor, and pays for water, fuel, and elec-
tricity. In addition to the broiler chicks, the
integrators supply the feed, vaccines, and any
necessary medications. When the broilers have
matured enough for market, they are returned
to the integrator where they are processed and
shipped, primarily to retail outlets.
The U.S. broiler industry is geographically
concentrated into four regions: South, North-
east, West, and North Central. It is the south-
ern states, particularly Arkansas and Georgia,
which dominate the nation in broiler produc-
tion. This geographic concentration suggests
the potential for price transmissions to vary
spatially.
Another key development in the broiler in-
dustry has been the changing nature of the end
product. Percentage of sales represented by the
traditional whole, fresh broiler examined here
declined throughout the sample period. The
bulk of the market now consists of further pro-
cessed products, fast food nuggets, and other,
harder to quantify forms. Despite this trend,
whole broilers still represent a sufficiently sig-
nificant portion of the market for examining
the competitiveness of price transmissions
while avoiding the complications of calculat-
ing margins for extensively processed prod-
ucts.
Theoretical Considerations of Price
Transmissions
Early research in perfectly competitive price
transmission processes suggested that consum-
er demand determined retail price, with lower
market-level prices being determined by sub-
traction of processing, transportation, and oth-
er costs (Thompson and Lyon). Models based
on this theory considered price spreads to be
derived through percentage or absolute price
markups, or a combination of the two.
Gardner later constructed a model to in-
corporate the concept that supply and market-
ing services, as well as demand, were relevant
to price spreads. In this framework, markups
change in different ways depending on wheth-
er the price change began on the farm supply
or retail demand side of the industry. The sub-
stantial demand increases experienced by the
broiler industry during the sample period
could thus be used in this model to explain
any evidence of asymmetry. As Kinnucan and
Forker suggest, however, growing stocks
should insulate prices from the effects of de-
mand shocks—and growing stocks were evi-
dent in the broiler industry over the sample
period.Bernard and Willett: Broiler Price Relationships 281
Heien’s margin work was impoflant in an-
alyzing the direction of price transmissions in
competitive markets. He developed a dynamic
markup model where, at each successive mar-
ket level from farm to wholesale to retail, the
price was based on the preceding level’s price
plus some markup. Thus, price changes flowed
from farm to wholesale to retail. Heien’s mod-
el depends on the assumptions of constant re-
turns to scale and fixed proportions, conditions
which Wohlgenant’s work has suggested exist
in the U.S. broiler industry.
Wohlgenant’s sample period, however, pre-
dates that of this study and the industry’s in-
creased concentration. 1 Ward reported that
such concentration may yield informational
advantages that could lead prices to emanate
outward from the wholesale market level to
farm and retail levels. For instance, a concen-
trated wholesale level, as in the broiler indus-
try, may be the center of price formation in
the market. Supply and demand factors in such
a model have less effect on margins and flows
than in the competitive models.
In connecting theory and empiricism, this
research on the broiler industry empirically
examines price transmissions in a manner the-
oretically consistent with Ward. Characteris-
tics of industry structure were considered
more important than supply and demand con-
cerns. Direction of price flows was tested,
rather than assumed on the basis of any of the
discussed models.
Methodology
Most asymmetry studies stem from Wolf-
fram’s method for splitting irreversible vari-
ables for regression modeling. While Wolf-
fram’s method, and Houck’s subsequent
refinements, were useful, they were appropri-
ate only within a static framework. Ward cap-
tured the dynamics of price transmissions by
adding the influences of past prices, while
1Wohlgenant’s sample period encompassed 1955
through 1983. For the majority of this time frame, it
is likely the broiler industry would be analyzed best
with a competitive model. The rationate behind the
present study is that important structural changes have
occurred since the early 1980s.
Boyd and Brorsen expanded asymmetry test-
ing to include testing speed of price adjust-
ments alongside overall effects, The four-step
procedure utilized here closely matches the
further improvements of Bailey and Brorsen.
Since autocorrelation has been a common
problem in asymmetry studies (Kinnucan and
Forker; Pick, Karrenbrock, and Carman; Boyd
and Brorsen), the initial step was to determine
the correct form for the data by conducting
unit root tests. Many economic time series are
nonstationary, typically exhibiting a trend
away from an initial value. To remove trend,
it must first be determined whether a model is
a trend stationary process (TSP) or a differ-
ence stationary process (DSP). A TSP model
should be detrended with the inclusion of a
trend variable, while a DSP should be detrend-
ed by using first differences (Nelson and
Kang). A model is identified as a DSP if it has
a unit root.
Unit root testing for the price variables in
the data set was performed using the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test on a one-period au-
toregressive model of the form:
Au, = (30+ (31U,.1 + ~zAu,.,
i- ~3TREND + g,,
where Au( is the first difference of the price
series at a time i, and a trend and constant term
have been included. MacKinnon critical t-val-
ues were used to test the coefficient on Mt.1,
with the null hypothesis of a unit root rejected
if the coefficient was determined to be signif-
icantly different from zero. From our review
of previous studies, only Bailey and Brorsen
have tested for unit roots.
The second step was to determine the
lengths of time between influences and ad-
justments among the prices. As bias from an
incorrect model will cause parameters to vary
from their true values, accuracy in lag length
is crucial for both causality and asymmetry
testing. Some studies (Boyd and Brorsen; Pun-
yawadee, Boyd, and Faminow) used past stud-
ies for lag determination, while Kinnucan ‘and
Forker, and Pick, Karrenbrock, and Carman
added/subtracted lags until significance282 JoumalofAgricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
changed. The present study, like that of Bailey
and Brorsen, used selection criteria.
Testing of lag lengths was performed in
two stages, following Hsiao’s testing meth-
odology for a bivariate autoregressive model.
While Hsiao used only Akaike’s final predic-
tion error (FPE) criterion, citing its ability to
balance the risk of under- or overestimating
the correct lag, recent research has used mul-
tiple criteria. Since the FPE, as noted by
Holmes and Hutton, has a tendency to overfit
lags, Schwarz’ Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) was also used in testing. BIC offers the
benefit of asymptotically eliminating the pos-
sibility of overestimation, although with an in-
creased chance of underestimation. In contrast,
Bailey and Brorsen used only Akaike’s infor-
mation criterion.2
The first stage of Hsiao’s procedure in-
volves discovery of the lag length of a uni-
variate function, while the second stage con-
siders the bivariate case. For a variable, Y,
thought to be explainable by itself, and anoth-
er variable, X, the bivariate autoregressive
model can be expressed as follows:
Y, = ~ ~,Y,_( + j (3,+m+lX,_,+ e,,
,=, ,=0
where m and n are to be estimated.
In both stages, lags were added sequential-
ly. No lag lengths were bypassed or tested for
removal once the lag length increased. The
first stage of the analysis consisted of univari-
ate testing of each Y to determine the order of
each of the variables lagged on itself. In the
second stage, each of the variables was in turn
lagged on all other variables with which it had
a theoretical relationship. The dependent vari-
able in each case was itself lagged to the ex-
tent discovered in stage one in each regres-
sion.
Discovered lag lengths were then used in
the equations for causality testing. To deter-
mine causality, a test proposed by Geweke,
Meese, and Dent, based on Sims’ test, was
used.3 To determine if an affected factor (AF)
has been acted upon by a causal factor (CF),
past values of the causal factor and past, pres-
ent, and future values of the affected factor
were used to explain the present value of the
causal factor. This specification was tested
against the same specification with the excep-
tion of the future values of the affected factor.
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where, in (1), the lead effect is represented by
m = –LAF through – 1 on the summation of
the affected factor. The lag length and lead
length on the affected factor were assumed to
be the same (LAF).
Results of causality and lag length tests
were used to assess the symmetry of price re-
lationships across market levels. The first step
in this process was to transform the variables
into differences from their initial value. This
was done because the hypothesis of revers-
ibility depends on the change in the value, not
its level. Independent price variables to be
tested for nonreversibility required further
transformation. These were segmented by di-
viding them into their upward and downward
movements, such that the new variables were
the cumulative sums over time of the increases
and decreases, respectively.
2We also used this criterion, but the results were
identicat to Akaike’s FPE, and so were not included
separately.
~Causality testing was also conducted using Gran-
ger’s original method. However, these results were
identical, and so were not included.Bernard and Willett: Broiler Price Relationships 283
Nonsegmented gas prices were then includ-
ed to represent transportation costs to the dif-
ferent regions. Using UPCF* and DWCF” to
represent the upward and downward move-
ments of the transformed causal price, AF* to
represent the transformed affected price, and
GAY for the transformed gasoline price, the
unrestricted equation for testing for asymmet-
ric price transmissions can be written:
LCF
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No constant term is included since it cancels
out when transformed into its difference from
its first value. Lag lengths, LCF, were again
as calculated in the lag length determination
tests. Additionally, in testing price links in-
volving the farm price, the transformed costs
of the two primary inputs were added to the
above equation.
Next, a series of restricted equations was
estimated. The first restricted equation tested
the cumulative effects over all lags, with all
up and down variables replaced by the corre-
sponding cumulative sums of the two. Using
FULLCF* to represent a combined price
change, and assuming other appropriate inde-
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The restricted and unrestricted equations
were compared statistically to determine if in-
creases in the causal price had a different influ-
ence than decreases. Tests of significance were
performed using the F-statistic. The null hy-
pothesis was that the coefficients on the upward
and downward price movements were equal, oc
Asymmetry was also investigated on a pe-
riod-b y-period basis. For each period, another
restricted equation regression was performed,
with the upward and downward price move-
ments for that lag period replaced by the com-
bined price change and the other periods left
segmented. Using the same notation as in (3),
the restricted equations for individual periods
followed the form:
A< = ~OTREND + (3,FULLCF;-,
LCF
+ x B3,JDWCH, + %
j= 0,]+/
where i was the period being tested, and with
any other appropriate nonsegmented indepen-
dent variables included.
Each period’s restricted equation was com-
pared statistically with the unrestricted equa-
tion to determine if price transmissions were
symmetric in that period. This allowed inves-
tigation of the speed of adjustment, similar to
the analysis of Bailey and Brorsen and others.
The importance of this procedure was to be
able to determine if brief asymmetries exist
but, as proposed by Pick, Karrenbrock, and
Carman, are quickly corrected. The test meth-
od was the same as for the cumulative effect
comparison.
Data
Monthly data used cover the period January
1983 through December 1992. As the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) changed
its reporting methods for the broiler industry
in 1983, this was an appropriate starting point.
By 1992, the industry’s concentration ratio
seemed to have stabilized, marking an appro-
priate endpoint for our study.
National wholesale and farm broiler prices,
as well as the costs of the two primary feed
ingredients, the Central Illinois price of No. 2
yellow corn and the Decatur price of soybean
meal (44% solvent), were taken from selected
issues of three USDA publications: Poultry
Market Statistics, Livestock and Poultry: Sit-284 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
uation and Outlook Report, and Livestock and
Poultry Update. The wholesale price was a
12-city weighted average series calculated by
dividing the country into three marketing
regions, and then weighing prices in each re-
gion by their population.4 The composite
weighted prices consisted of U.S. Grade A and
Plant Grade branded and unbranded whole-
carcass products and whole birds without gib-
lets.
The farm price was calculated as the equiv-
alent live weight return to producers. The for-
mula is based on the ready-to-cook price with
a combination of processing costs and dress-
ing percentage subtracted. While such a deri-
vation portends possible difficulties with em-
pirical analysis, the series closely mirrored a
weekly Arkansas farm price collected from a
survey of integrators.
Retail prices for whole, fresh chickens
were collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics using four U.S. sampling regions:
West, South, North Central, and Northeast.5
Additionally, a national price was calculated
as a population weighted average of the re-
gional prices.
For transportation costs, a national retail
price of gasoline was collected from National
Petroleum News: Factbook Issue. This price
was an average of all types of gasoline avail-
able and includes taxes and variations due to
types of service.b We believe this series cap-
tures any price relationship differences due to
the varying distances between concentrated
broiler production areas and the spatially dis-
tinct retail regions.
Other data variables were investigated, but
were not found to be statistically usable.7 La-
bor costs specific enough to represent actual
costs incurred at the various market levels in
the broiler industry, as well as desired mar-
keting costs (especially advertising), were not
available. Data problems thus limited the ex-
tent to which potential model components
could be included. As Ward noted, however,
an understanding of pricing relationships can
be determined without complete elaboration of
the market, and it was believed empirical anal-
ysis would not be affected significantly.
Empirical Results
Unit root tests on the data series were evalu-
ated first. The retail price in the South rejected
a unit root at the 5% level, while all other
broiler price variables, except the Northeast
retail price, rejected the null hypothesis of a
unit root at the 10% level. The price variables
for corn, soy, and gasoline, however, failed to
reject the unit root hypothesis. Based on these
results and a desire for consistency, equations
were constructed as TSP, using levels and in-
cluding a trend term.
Table 1 summarizes the results from the lag
determination tests. Looking at the FPE re-
sults, several relationships indicated the appro-
priate lag length was three months or less. As
expected, the Schwarz criterion suggested
generally lower lag lengths more in the range
of one month, although it reached the identical
conclusion for many relationships.8 Results
from the straightforward maximization of the
adjusted R* were included only for comparison
purposes, but notably often matched the FPE
criterion.
4The 12 cities were Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York,
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco.
5These price data were supplied by R. BuzzeU of
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, whose help we
gratefully acknowledge,
6While broiler transport vehicles run mainly on
diesel fuel, such a distinct series was unavailable.
Graphical analyses of leaded, unleaded, and premium
unleaded prices over the past decade showed strong
correlation, and it was believed that diesel fuel would
be similarly related. Therefore, the overall average was
accepted as a suitable proxy.
7Other variables considered included the concen-
tration ratio, broiler exports, broilers slaughtered, and
the.retail prices of beef and pork, the competing meats.
Unfortunately, these variables proved too highly cor-
related with trend and with one another to include in
the models (all correlations greater than 0.85). In ad-
dition, there were insufficient data to generate a grower
input variable for buildings and equipment.
8To help gauge the appropriateness of the lag
lengths, geparate tests were performed on a weekty
data set. Results suggested lags ranging primarily from
three to seven weeks. Hence, we conclude the monthly
lags were accurate.Bernard and Willett: Broiler Price Relationships 285




Dependent Lagged FPE Schwarz
Variable Variable Lag Lag Lag Value
corn corn 3 2 3
Soybean Soybean 1 1 1
Farm Farm 3 1 3
Gas Gas 4 2 4
Wholesale Wholesale 3 1 3
Retail (Nat) Retail (Nat) 2 2 2
Retail (W) Retail (W) 1 1 1
Retail (NE) Retail (NE) 1 1 1
Retail (S) Retail (S) 2 2 2
Retail (NC) Retail (NC) 1 1 1
Farm Corn o 0 0
Farm Soybean o 0 0
Farm Wholesale 1 0 1
Farm Retail (Nat) 1 1 1
Farm Retail (W) 3 1 3
Farm Retail (NE) 3 1 3
Farm Retail (S) 1 1 1
Farm Retail (NC) 3 1 3
Wholesale Farm 1 1 1
Wholesale Gas o 0 0
Wholesale Retail (Nat) 1 1 3
Wholesale Retail (W) 2 2 3
Wholesale Retail (NE) 3 1 3
Wholesale Retail (S) 4 4 4
Wholesale Retail (NC) 3 1 3
Retail (Nat) Farm 3 3 3
Retail (W) Farm 4 1 1
Retail (NE) Farm 2 2 2
Retail (S) Farm 3 3 3
Retail (NC) Farm 2 2 2
Retail (Nat) Wholesale 3 3 3
Retail (W) Wholesale 1 0 0
Retail (NE) Wholesale 2 2 2
Retail (S) Wholesale 3 3 3
Retail (NC) Wholesale 2 0 2




































The lag tests between prices and inputs
such as corn, soybeans, and gas indicated low
R2 values and zero lags. While these tests sug-
gested the input variables were unnecessary,
they were left in the asymmetry model due to
the theoretical rationale for including input
prices. Lag results may be due simply to the
aggregated, averaged nature of the data.
Lag results were used to determine causal-
ity and asymmetry.g Causality results, dis-
played in table 2, showed wholesale prices
cause farm prices and retail prices in all
regions, and farm prices cause retail prices in
all regions, while the retail prices in each re-
9The resultsdiscussedwere derivedusingthelag
resultsfrom the FPE criterion.End resultsfrom the
Schwarzcriteriondid not vary.286 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996






Farm Retail (Nat) 0.449
Farm Retail (W) 0.754
Farm Retail (NE) 0.372
Farm Retail (S) 1.240
Farm Retail (NC) 0.126
Wholesale Farm 1.145
Wholesale Gas 0.570
Wholesale Retail (Nat) 0.343
Wholesale Retail (W) 0.446
Wholesale Retail (NE) 0.264
Wholesale Retail (S) 1.016
Wholesale Retail (NC) 0,685
Retail (Nat) Farm 9.804**
Retail (W) Farm 14.590**
Retail (NE) Farm 19.457**
Retail (S) Farm 13,616**
Retail (NC) Farm 21.090**
Retail (Nat) Wholesale 12.913**
Retail (W) Wholesale 16.577**
Retail (NE) Wholesale 22,995**
Retail (S) Wholesale 18.157**
Retail (NC) Wholesale 24.516**
Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote rejection of
the hypothesis of no causality cause to effect at the 0.05
and 0.01 levels, respectively. Nat = National, W = West,
NE = Northeast, S = South, and NC = North Central.
gion do not cause either wholesale price or
farm price. The oddest of these results, the
farm-to-retail link in the absence of a farm-to-
wholesale link, is difficult to interpret theoret-
ically. Unless retailers are being cautious of
the potential market power of the wholesalers
and check farm prices to make sure they are
not being exploited, little justification can be
found, This result may be a residual effect of
the causality exerted on both by the wholesale
price. The wholesale-to-farm and wholesale-
to-retail links are consistent with increased
concentration of the integrators, and conform
to Ward’s beliefs. Still, the market power of
the integrators implied by these results may or
may not be harmful, depending on the results
of the asymmetry tests.
Autocorrelation proved a serious problem
in conducting the asymmetry tests, with Dur-
bin-Watson statistics from initial runs ranging
from 0.5 to 0.9. Normally, this would suggest
the variables should be first difference, but
this would have conflicted with the results of
the unit root tests.[o Investigating further, those
variables found to have a unit root were dif-
ference and the regressions rerun; but auto-
correlation persisted. Removal of the unit root
variables did improve the Durbin-Watson sta-
tistic, suggesting there may be difficulties
modeling TSP and DSP variables in the same
equation. In the end, autocorrelation was cor-
rected by running the regressions as autore-
gressive processes of order one.
The results of the asymmetry tests for the
cumulative effect, current month, and one
month lagged effects can be seen in table 3.
The key result was the downward price asym-
metry from wholesale to farm; there was a sig-
nificant difference in the effect of increases
and decreases at the O.01 level, both cumula-
tively and for the lagged month. It appears that
integrators are not passing on price changes at
the wholesale level to producers symmetrical-
ly. This implies wholesalers may be using
market power in updating contract prices.
The results from the wholesale to retail lev-
els were not consistent over the different
regions, suggesting upward price asymmetry
from wholesale to retail cumulative in the
North Central region, cumulatively and at one
month lagged on the national level, and at one
month lagged in the South region, all at the
0.05 level. Curiously, despite the different
conclusion from the cumulative effects, the
values of the relationships in the South and
the North Central regions were very close. In
the Northeast and West, upward cumulative
price effects were slightly higher than down-
ward effects, but neither was significant. The
West in particular showed near matching totals
cumulatively and at each lag. These results
add evidence to the theory of geographical
market power by the integrators in the South,
but suggest their power may be balanced out
10Unit root tests were run again, this time without
a trend term, but with the same end results.Bernard and Willett: Broiler Price Relationships 287
Table 3. Asymmetry Test Results
Cumulative Effect CurrentMonth Previous Month
Prices In- De- In- De- In- De-


























































































































Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote rejection of the hypothesis that the effect from a price increase equals
the effect from a price decrease at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Nat = National, W = West, NE = Northeast,
S = South, and NC = North Central.
by the power of retailers in more distant mar-
kets.
Both the South and North Central regions
showed significant upward asymmetry from
farm to retail market levels, at the 0.01 level
cumulatively, and at 0.05 for one month
lagged in the South. Additionally, the national
retail price also showed upward price asym-
metry cumulatively at the 0.01 level. The
Northeast region had a wide spread between
upward and downward cumulative effects,
which surprisingly failed to be significant.
While other results were not significant, in
most cases the F-statistic was higher than it
had been in the wholesale to retail cases. It is
understandable that the farm to retail results
tend to be more significant than the wholesale
to retail tests. As the farm level was shown to
suffer downward asymmetry, and some retail
prices upward, their values should be more op-
posed than wholesale and retail. In other
words, both appear to emanate outward, op-
positely, from the wholesale price.
For asymmetry tests conducted on two and
three months’ previous effects, there was an
occasional appearance of negative coefficients,
results contrary to our a priori hypotheses.
Possible explanations for these include incor-
rect lag specification, poor model specifica-
tion, multicollinearity, or insignificant effects.
The problem was most pronounced at later lag
periods, suggesting some lag lengths may have
been overestimated.
Also not reported in table 3 was the sig-
nificance of the other inputs. Coefficients on
gas prices were positive for all the retail
regions, but were only significant at the 0.10
level in the North Central and the West. When
included nationally, gas price coefficients were
negative with even lower t-statistics. The in-
significance of gas prices suggests this vari-
able has less relative importance in total costs
in large portions of the country than had been
hypothesized.
Corn and soybean prices typically had op-
posite signs from one another, and further tests
indicated the coefficients were not robust. It is
likely that even though these expenses are in-
curred by the integrators, they are still farm
input costs that enter the system and are ac-
counted for prior to the farm and wholesale
price spread. Hence, corn and soybean prices
were not included in the final test results re-
ported in table 3.
As another convenient way to visualize the
results, elasticities of price transmission were
calculated from the asymmetry regressions.
Elasticity measures for increases and decreas-
es in the causal prices in both the short and
long run are displayed in table 4. For both the288 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1996
Table4. Elasticities of Price Transmissions
ElasticityWhen Causal Price Is:
Prices Increasing Decreasing
Effect Cause Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
Farm Wholesale 1.072 1.099 1.092 1.247
Retail (Nat) Farru 0.254 0.572 0.219 0.424
Retail (W) Farm 0.308 0.432 0.219 0.343
Retail (NE) Farm 0.203 0.488 0.149 0.315
Retail (S) Farm 0.281 0.633 0.215 0.472
Retail (NC) Farm 0.255 0.644 0.308 0.472
Retail (Nat) Wholesale 0.293 0.627 0.208 0.538
Retail (W) Wholesale 0.305 0.473 0.266 0.451
Retail (NE) Wholesale 0.185 0.507 0.177 0.415
Retail (S) Wholesale 0.273 0.699 0.217 0.617
Retail (NC) Wholesale 0.299 0.715 0.284 0.603
Notes: Nat = National, W = West, NE = Northeast, S = South, and NC = North Central.
short and long run, the decreasing wholesale
price elasticities with respect to farm price ex-
ceeded those for the increasing wholesale
price. Similarly, with one exception, the in-
creasing farm and wholesale price elasticities
with respect to the retail prices surpassed the
respective decreasing price elasticities, In all
cases, long-run elasticities appeared substan-
tially greater than the short run, supporting the
lag length test results that full price adjust-
ments require some months.
Conclusions and Implications
The concentration and power of the integrators
have allowed the wholesale price to become
the center, causal price in the market. The det-
rimental effects of this situation, however, ap-
pear limited. For broiler growers, there are
reasons for concern with downward move-
ments in wholesale price passed on more fully
to them than increases in the wholesale price.
Consumers, on the other hand, are not suffer-
ing from price asymmetries. Only in the North
Central region of the nation are wholesalers
able to share a larger portion of their price
increases with consumers than they do their
price decreases. Consumer broiler prices in the
Northeast even appear more affected by fac-
tors not determined by this research than by
the power of the integrators.
With the changing nature of the end prod-
uct in the broiler industry, consumers in fact
may be more concerned with the competitive-
ness of price transmissions for further pro-
cessed products. While the whole broiler data
set used here contained both branded and un-
branded prices, product differentiation is eas-
ier and more persuasive for these products.
How much, then, the implications of this study
carry over to such products is an open area for
future research. The collection of accurate and
consistent price data, especially in light of the
multitude of product forms, will be the great-
est hindrance to such an effort.
Based on the results, it appears evident that
additional study should also be conducted on
other industries exhibiting increasing concen-
tration or other components of imperfect com-
petition. The analytical framework identified
here is an appropriate method to evaluate these
price transmission relationships.
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